Let’s not call this a “free-agency losers” column, at least just yet. After all, the landscape has changed when it comes to the first few days in July.
Picking losers in free agency isn’t quite the slam dunk it used to be because it’s become a lot harder to truly “lose” in free agency than it was just a few years ago. First of all, with so few stars changing teams via free agency, we see far fewer situations of a team being left in the lurch because a key player left without compensation.
Second, between the new CBA and the general fact of teams getting a bit smarter about long-term contracts, we just see a lot fewer irrationally exuberant free-agent contracts than we did as recently as 2019. That was the last year of the overhand of the old CBA contracts that were functionally unextendable, and as I noted earlier this week, cap space has had a much different application since then.
In today’s era, we see a lot more of two situations instead: 1) Teams so stuck by the rules and their own tax situations that they can hardly do anything, and 2) teams overpaying their own players rather than somebody else’s.
Both of those situations stick out as I go through which teams have progressed the least in free agency thus far — with the giant asterisk that we have over three months until the season starts, trade season is just getting cooking and a few relatively significant free agents still remain.
Again, I hesitate to call these teams “losers” as that term just doesn’t quite apply the way it used to. Nonetheless, I do think a few teams might not be feeling great about their summers just yet:
Of all the teams we might rank as “losers,” the Raptors stick out as No. 1, for three rather obvious reasons: 1) They didn’t want to lose Fred VanVleet, 2) they did, and 3) they have no great way of replacing him. While signing Dennis Schröder is a Band-Aid that can kinda sorta get them through the season (and was clearly the best available option with the money Toronto had), this in no way offsets losing an All-Star-ish-caliber player.
What hurts more is that Houston’s offer actually wasn’t that crazy; two years at the max plus a third with a team option. This probably should have been affordable for Toronto and probably should have been something the Raptors planned for going back to last season given the number of cap room teams that needed point guard help.
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I’m wondering if one wrinkle really wrong-footed them: Gary Trent Jr. opting in to his deal for $19 million. By doing so, he made matching a max offer on VanVleet a tax question; doing so would have put the Raptors $10 million over before they used a cent of their midlevel exception (that number presumes the Raptors had waived Thaddeus Young and not signed Schröder to replace VanVleet); filling out the roster would have pushed that number even higher.
There were hidden costs once Trent opted in. Realistically, a max for VanVleet would have cost them their full MLE as an over-apron team (they could have done the Jalen McDaniels deal with the tax MLE instead of the biannual) and likely would have cost them again in draft capital to reduce the tax hit to a more reasonable number for a middling team. A Chris Boucher salary dump, or something similar, wouldn’t have been cheap.
A more interesting question is whether the Raptors can now shift their roster to something more workable than a bunch of below-average-shooting 6-foot-9 guys going one-on-one. The VanVleet deal may look a lot better in 20-20 hindsight if Toronto can parlay Pascal Siakam or O.G. Anunoby into a good guard who can shoot. It just remains to be seen who that player is and what kind of deal is doable; I’m not breaking any news here, but exasperation with the Raptors in trade talks remains a theme when talking to other front offices.
Even with all that, I’m still a bit amazed Toronto didn’t just swallow hard and agree to pay VanVleet, knowing he’d likely be tradeable later. I mean, this has been Masai Ujiri’s calling card going back to Denver. Can I even call it the Masui Ujiri Memorial Delayed Sign-and-Trade anymore? I’m so confused.
In a vacuum, the Pelicans had the right idea in declining the fourth-year option on Herb Jones to lock him into this next contract right now (a reported four years, $54 million). The problem is that entailed a $10 million raise for Jones this season, and the Pelicans … don’t really have the money for it.
Even after waiving Garrett Temple on Wednesday, New Orleans projects to be $5 million over the tax line if it fills the last two roster slots with veteran minimum contracts. This is a franchise that is, shall we say, averse to paying the luxury tax, which means the likelihood remains high that the Pels move either Kira Lewis Jr. or Jonas Valančiūnas just to shimmy under. How much that will cost them remains a question.
In an alternate universe, the Pelicans could have used a chunk of their MLE to sign another veteran guard and ease their dependence on Dyson Daniels and Jordan Hawkins to man high-minute rotation spots. And the cost? Jones might have cost more next year, but it’s hard to say whether he would have had offers significantly above the MLE, especially as a non-shooter. Historically, the MLE has been about as far as teams will go for players of this ilk, even for the most elite defenders, if they can’t space the floor. Additionally, Jones would have still been a restricted free agent, and the Pels’ matching rights would have scared off suitors.
We’re still mid-stream here, and there may be a trade on the table that lets New Orleans have Jones for tomorrow and still maximize its 2023-24 squad. But right now, it looks too cute by half.
Speaking of which … the Kings did the Pelicans’ move in larger script, using their cap space to renegotiate-and-extend Domantas Sabonis in a deal that gives him $195 million of new money and keeps him in royal purple for four more years.
Given the most any other team could have paid Sabonis next summer is $193 million, it was notable to see the Kings committing to $195 million right now. Usually when a team inks an extension a year out like this for a player who isn’t quite on the A-list, it can negotiate for more of a haircut on the extension years.
The Kings essentially went the opposite way and paid extra for the privilege of giving Sabonis a four-year max, including surrendering a first-round pick this year to clear the extra cap room. (Richaun Holmes’ contract was a dog, obviously, but it wasn’t blocking Sacramento from any other moves, either this year or next.)
The, “Who were you bidding against?” question here looms large. Sabonis isn’t Jaylen Brown; while he had a great year, he doesn’t have 29 other teams thirsting to acquire him. That’s because he’s a center and not a wing and not exactly a seamless fit on many (most?) contending rosters because you have to play through him on offense and you can’t switch with him on defense. It seems somewhat unlikely any team would have offered him that four-year max a year from now, among the subset that even had the space.
Sacramento locked in that price a year earlier and gave up its first-round pick to do it; while the Kings will have Sabonis on a lower number the next four years than his true max, the difference isn’t large (it looks like it will be $3 million to $6 million a year, depending on how much of the Kings’ cap room is added to 2023-24 and what his incentives look like in the extension).
And the lingering question is … was he really the kind of flight risk that they needed to lock in $50 million-plus for 2027-28 right now?
Whatever you think of Sabonis’ deal — and I’ve had people I respect disagree with me on that one — Jerami Grant’s deal strikes me as objectively worse on multiple levels. The Blazers agreed to a five-year, $160 million deal for Grant under one set of assumptions — the “do-it-all-for-Dame” approach that couldn’t possibly stomach losing Grant — and found out within hours of agreeing to it that they were working under very different conditions. In a Lillard-less future, overpaying to keep Grant makes a lot less sense.
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One can argue Grant’s deal still might have some trade value at that price, but it’s only returning draft capital if a toxic contract is coming back. “Sure, you can have a first, but you’re also getting Ben Simmons” — that’s the type of deal they’d be getting.
The Blazers likely had some wiggle room to negotiate on this but seemed reluctant to push too hard while they were walking on the Lillard eggshells. If they could have done this over, they likely could have taken a much harder line with Grant, knowing it wouldn’t be the end of the world if he walked. In particular, whittling him down to something more Kyle Kuzma-ish (he got four years and $104 million from the Wizards) likely would have made this much more marketable for trade purposes.
At the very least, Portland should be able to do declining money on Grant’s deal so that the value proposition hopefully gets better, rather than worse, over time. The Blazers are below the tax line now and figure to clear more room once a Lillard trade happens, which should allow them to start Grant at $36 million in 2023-24 and give him eight percent declines to $27.6 million in 2027-28.
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The Nuggets are going to be really good next year no matter what because their five best players are better than your five best players. However, what happens after that point on the roster is anyone’s guess right now.
The Nuggets had no realistic means of preventing Bruce Brown’s departure and were faced with a brutal point guard market. One can fairly question, however, whether they would have been better off using their taxpayer midlevel exception on a true wing rather than paying Reggie Jackson on a two-year deal.
The Nuggets hedged their bets by pushing future draft capital into this year’s draft and selecting three players with late picks; obviously the hope is that at least one of them can contribute right way, especially since they seemed focused on selecting older players. However, even highly drafted rookies rarely contribute at a playoff-team-rotation-caliber level in their first season, and historically, the only real distinguishing feature of drafting older rookies is that they’re … older.
It’s also perhaps surprising that more good wings weren’t flocking to play in Denver for a year and get a Brown-type payday. Phoenix seemingly got anyone it wanted with minimum deals while the Nuggets were left with Justin Holiday, who was salary-dumped by the Hawks last season and quickly fell out of the Mavs’ rotation when they picked him up in the buyout market.
With Jeff Green also departed, the Nuggets are looking at defending their title with a second unit of something like Jackson/Christian Braun/Julian Strawther/Peyton Watson/Zeke Nnaji. Yikes. You can insert names like Vlatko Cancar, Jalen Pickett and Holiday if it makes you feel better, but the takeaway is the same. This front office has hit on a ton of draft picks and made some amazing lemonade from last year’s offseason, so that track record deserves respect. But right now, it’s fair to wonder about pretty much every bench spot on Denver’s roster.
(Top photo of Jerami Grant: Stephen Lew / USA Today)
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